Category Archives: General -Thèmes Généraux

The geopolitical influence of Russia on Turkish political tactics and strategies


The extraordinarily troublesome year 2020 tested many international institutions and bilateral ties, but few experienced sharper challenges than the complex and troubled relations between Russia and Turkey,which have a strong impact on crisis developments in Europe’s immediate neighborhood.

In the last two decades, Turkish foreign policy has undergone a remarkable transformation and Eurasianism, with its anti-Western and pro-Russian rhetoric, has become more visible in the foreign policy practices/activities of the JDP (Justice and Development Party) government.

The question regarding the nature of the relations between Turkey and Russia it seems so much contradictory today. On the side of a NATO member perspective, one could say that Turkey’s positioning is ”highly isolated and more broadly leads members to reflect on the positioning of its vis-à-vis the United States”, whose unilateralism is now giving rise to new alliances.

While closer relations bring several benefits with little cost to Russia, it is difficult to say the same for Turkey, particularly when it comes to the cost of these relations. One could make a long list of benefits that Russia gains from engagement or cooperation. Meanwhile Turkey has accrued some benefits—for example, by disrupting the plans of Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD in northwestern Syria—but this has come at a high price). Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400 missile systems from Russia has led to its removal from the United States’ F-35 program and sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. In broader terms, its closer relations with Russia have generated heated discussions in the West regarding Turkey’s place in .

The tumultuous year 2020 tested and significantly degraded the always ambiguous Russian-Turkish partnership, which has become transactional at best and certainly not “strategic”. The foundation of economic ties, and first of all the export of Russian natural gas to Turkey, has seriously weakened. Even if both states experience an economic recovery in the coming months, which is by no means certain, the trade and investment flows would hardly recover. In the temporarily and disagreeably suspended Syrian and Libyan wars, Russia and Turkey are not only backing opposite factions but also manipulating the risks of a direct military confrontation. Turkish forceful interference in the Nagorno Karabakh war was decisive in securing the victory for Azerbaijan and devalued Russian security guarantees for Armenia.

This breakthrough was far more disturbing for Moscow than the official discourse reveals, and the deployment of a Russian peacekeeping force cannot restore the capacity to dominate security developments in the Caucasus. Personal ties between the two ambitious leaders suffice for finding a mode of deconflicting in these war zones, but their mutual irritation and mistrust are accumulating. Thirty years ago, Russia’s supremacy in the Caspian Sea was unquestioned. Even with the independence of new countries with their own navies in the early 1990s, Russia and its Caspian Flotilla had little to fear.

On June 26 of this year, the Turkish government began constructing the first bridge over Canal Istanbul, the huge waterway project designed to run parallel to the Bosporus Strait. Ankara has presented the megaproject as a strategic move that will turn Turkey into a logistics base and grant it geo-political leverage over both regional and international trade and transportation routes. However, Turkey’s political opposition considers Canal Istanbul to be a rent-seeking project designed to attract international – prob­ably Chinese and Arab – investment in the hope of reviving Turkey’s deteriorating economy. The Canal may also affect the Montreux Convention, the decades old treaty that governs the Turkish Straits. Given the rivalry between the US and Russia, ques­tions around the Montreux Convention will add another point of contention, increase tensions and may also present serious consequences for Turkey.

Russia, however, would be deeply concerned about any attempt to alter the status quo as the Convention constrains unwelcome Western presence in the Black Sea while also providing Russia an opportu­nity to develop an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capability. Arguably, the impor­tance of the Turkish Straits for Russia has increased with the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011.

The maturing of autocratic regimes in Russia and Turkey does not facilitate their rapprochement in the security domain, as each ambitious ruler is more interested in exploiting the opportunities emerging from the conflict the other one is facing in relations with the West than in extending a helping hand to the fellow dictator-in distress. Also some observers suggest Ankara could see its drone sales to Ukraine as powerful leverage over Moscow in a number of regional disputes that are going on between the two.

A major problem for Turkey in its relations with Russia remains the asymmetry, even if interdependent, in favour of Moscow. Yet, the nature of asymmetry is dynamic and subject to change, as Turkey has engaged in what can be termed dependency reduction on Russia, both geopolitically and structurally (energy-wise).

  • Eurasianism and Blue Homeland

With the demise of the Soviet Union, Turkey saw the emergence of a potential area of influence for itself in Central Asia. Supported by the West, its Eurasianism in this period meant Turkey could play a leading role in the affairs of the newly independent Central Asian and Caucasus states. Hence it was also premised on a competitive agenda with Russia. However, despite its early eagerness to take advantage of this epochal development, Turkey failed to cultivate a leading role in Central Asia.

Unlike the more geopolitically informed early forms of its Eurasianism in the post-Cold War era, Turkey’s recent turn to Eurasia, driven partially by its deepening discontent with the West, seeks to build closer relations with Russia and China. This latest form, present earlier among some military officers and marginal political groups in the early 2000s, carries a strong suspicion of the West as the constitutive ingredient of its political identity. Thus, the current Eurasianism is essentially an ideological disposition rather than a coherent geopolitical vision. Its most recent manifestation can be seen through the imprecise, nebulous, and unofficial Blue Homeland geopolitical concept.

The Blue Homeland concept effectively means three things. First, it represents an expanded vision and understanding of Turkey’s maritime boundaries in the Mediterranean. Second, it is the navy’s call to reimagine and reposition the country as a maritime power. Third, the ideological concept—as exemplified by the narrative of its creators who believe that Turkish geopolitical interests are better served through realignment with Russia and China—signifies a reimagining of the country’s place in the world.

Syria is central to the current shape of Turkey-Russia relations. It offers a model of partnership for both countries in a context where their interests are competitive. However, the Syrian-centric cooperation between Turkey and Russia is also special and is thus unlikely to be replicated elsewhere due to structural constraints and contextual nuances.

Developments at the broader international level, a new administration in the US, and rising tension between Ukraine and Russia indicate that Turkey would face more constraints and higher costs for its geopolitical balancing act between the West and Russia.

In spite of the dynamism and developments in Tur­kish-Russian relations since 2015, analysts say that they cannot extra­polate that the same level of cooperation will con­tinue, provided that Turkish-Western relations do not experience a rupture.

  • The new instable geopolitical puzzle

To explain these increasingly close relations in recent years, the analysis mainly features Turkey’s motives. What is perplexing is not that Russia would want to form closer relations with Turkey regionally or bilaterally; the benefits of such engagements for Russia is clear. On top of economic and energy inter­ests (including Russia building Turkey’s first nuclear power plant) and given Turkey’s membership in NATO, undermining NATO’s cohesion and creating more friction between Ankara and its NATO partners serve Russia’s interests. For instance, as a NATO mem­ber, Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 systems confers more prestige on these systems and generates more tension between Turkey and the US – both of these developments serve Russia well.

Similarly, coopera­tion with Turkey gave more legitimacy to Russian-designed processes in the conflict zones, most impor­tantly in Syria. The list of benefits that Russia has accrued from its engagements or cooperation with Turkey goes on. Plus, unlike Turkey, Russia does not have to pay a cost for forming increasingly close rela­tions with Turkey. In contrast, from being removed from the F-35 fighter jet programme to the CAATSA sanctions to the deepening crisis in its relations with the West, Turkey has to pay a heavy price for its close relations with Russia and purchasing the Russian-made S-400 missile systems.

The concept of an “axis of excluded” has been utilised as one of the explanatory paradigms that has been adopted by certain analysts to account for the deepening of Turkish-Russian relations. The basic argument behind this approach is that, despite struc­tural differences and contrasting worldviews  be­tween Turkey and Russia, both actors are opting for closer relations as a result of their shared frustrations with Western and US policies being directed towards them.

The state and health of Turkish-US relations has a direct impact on the nature of Turkish-Russian relations. At least, this is the case from Turkey’s per­spective. Relatedly, the opacity of US policy – or the perceived loss of its strategic clarity – the nature of its local partnerships in Syria (particularly its evolving relationships with the Syrian Democratic Forces, the backbone of which is formed by the YPG, which is affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, PKK), and regional alliances (the US being highly supportive of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Israel’s regional designs and visions in recent years) have further driven wedges between Turkey and the US. 

In this regard, Turkey’s governing elites often justify Turkey’s closer relations with Russia and China by referring to the fashionable, but largely nebulous, concept of searching for strategic autonomy in Turkish foreign policy. 

 It is also important to note that the natures of the political economies of Turkey and Russia are also constraining factors in bilateral relations. Russia pursues policies that will reflect the interests of a major energy-exporting country, whereas Turkey represents a major energy-importing country in its regional policy. Whereas Russia favours high energy prices, Turkey’s interests lie in low energy prices, particularly given Turkey’s huge current account deficit, which is partially caused by Turkey’s increasing energy needs. This incompatibility in the two countries’ political eco­nomies will have some implications on their regional policies and interactions.

Both of them, Turkey and Russia have had different standings on the regional status quo. At the regional level, after the Arab uprisings, Turkey operated as a revisionist power. It supported the overthrow of authoritarian regimes and the establishment of a new regional order, developing closer relations with the pro-change forces in the region. Despite the fact that in recent years, Turkey has adopted a much more cautious stance on the continuing waves of protests in the Middle East, this does not change the overall picture.

In contrast, Russia has operated as a status quo power in the region, displaying clear preferences for regional authoritarian strong men such as Sisi and Assad. It was suspicious towards the Arab uprisings and supported the incumbent regimes. Such a diver­gence of preferences as regards the regional status quo created a strategic incompatibility between the two powers’ regional visions.

However, to be honest, I don’t believe the fact that renowned think tanks keep pushing the scenario possibility that Ankara will leave NATO and pursue its own foreign/military policy. If there is one thing which will never happen in Turkey, that is the exit from this alliance. Never. For a simple reason: NATO is the ultimate shield protecting Turkey against nuclear powers in the proximity, especially against Russia.

References:

  1. https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/baev_turkey_russia_2021.pdf
  2. https://www.gmfus.org/news/turkeys-geopolitical-and-ideological-eurasianism-and-its-relations-russia
  3. https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2021RP05/

GREY WOLF : THE ESCAPE OF ADOLF HITLER (2014) 


This is a dramatization of supposed real events – the untold story of Adolf Hitler’s escape to Argentina at the end of WW2.

Based on interviews with eye witnesses in Argentina and years of detailed research, the film covers events from Hitler’s escape by air from the ruins of Berlin on April 28th, 1945, to Fuerteventura on the Canary Islands and then by U-boat to Argentina where he died tormented, demented and betrayed at a small house, ‘La Clara’ 45 miles from San Carlos De Bariloche in the Argentine Andes, at 3pm on February 13th, 1962.

Grey Wolf: The Escape of Adolf Hitler was originally a 2011 book by Gerrard Williams and Simon Dunstan. The book was adapted as a drama documentary film in 2014 directed and written by Gerrard Williams and produced by Magnus Peterson.

After Allied forces defeated Germany in World War II, Europe became a difficult place to be associated with Adolph Hitler’s Third Reich. Thousands of Nazi officers, high-ranking party members and collaborators—including many notorious war criminals—escaped across the Atlantic, finding refuge in South America, particularly in Argentina, Chile and Brazil.

Argentina, for one, was already home to hundreds of thousands of German immigrants and had maintained close ties to Germany during the war. After 1945, Argentine President Juan Perón, himself drawn to fascist ideologies, enlisted intelligence officers and diplomats to help establish “rat lines,” or escape routes via Spanish and Italian ports, for many in the Third Reich. Also giving aid: the Vatican in Rome, which in seeking to help Catholic war refugees also facilitated fleeing Nazis—sometimes knowingly, sometimes not.

As thousands of Nazis and their collaborators poured into the continent, a sympathetic and sophisticated network developed, easing the transition for those who came after. While no definitive evidence exists that Hitler himself escaped his doomsday bunker and crossed the ocean, such a network could have helped make it possible.

Thank you for passing by!

The Economic Outlook of Turkey in June 2021


From humble beginnings Recep Tayyip Erdogan has grown into a political giant, reshaping Turkey more than any leader since Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the revered father of the modern republic.

But in recent years the economy has deteriorated. Inflation is nearly 12% and the Turkish lira has slumped against the dollar. Coronavirus is exacerbating Turkey’s economic woes.

When he became Turkish leader back in March 2003 the lira rate was 1.6 to the dollar – now it is above 8.0. His early years in power were marked by solid growth and a development boom.

1: Turkish Lira Exchange Rate to US Dollar, Source: XE

The World Bank on April estimated that Turkey’s poverty rate rose to 12.2% last year, from 10.2% in 2019, and said returning to pre-pandemic levels would be a challenge. The World Bank also states that Turkey’s economic and social development performance since the early 2000s has been impressive, leading to increased employment and incomes and making Turkey an upper-middle-income country. However, in the past few years, growing economic vulnerabilities and a more challenging external environment have threatened to undermine those achievements. 

The World Bank said the impact of the pandemic would be a “struggle to shake off” globally but that Turkey’s economy is expected to grow 5% this year due a recovery in exports.

It warned that rising inflation in advanced economies could lead to “destabilising movements in global liquidity away from emerging markets” and added that growth prospects could also be hit by a resurgence of COVID-19 cases.

Analysis

For most of the period since 2000, Turkey has maintained a long-term focus on implementing ambitious reforms in many areas, and government programs have targeted vulnerable groups and disadvantaged regions. Poverty incidence more than halved over 2002–15, and extreme poverty fell even faster. 

During this time, Turkey rapidly urbanized, maintained strong macroeconomic and fiscal policy frameworks, opened to foreign trade and finance, harmonized many laws and regulations with European Union (EU) standards, and greatly expanded access to public services. It also recovered well from the global financial crisis of 2008/09.

The Turkish economy was one of few globally to expand in 2020 despite coronavirus fallout, thanks largely to a credit boom around mid-year.

Overall inflation was around 12% – and near 20% for food – for much of last year before climbing. Tourism revenue sharply declined and exports fell, leading to a large current account deficit.

The government in response topped up employee wages and banned layoffs, keeping a lid on the unemployment rate.

The recent Turkish crisis, started in 2018, was caused by the Turkish economy’s excessive current account deficit and large amounts of private foreign-currency denominated debt, in combination with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s increasing authoritarianism and his unorthodox ideas about interest rate policy.  Some analysts also stress the leveraging effects of the geopolitical frictions with the United States and recently enforced tariffs by the Trump administration on some Turkish products such as steel and aluminum.

The Turkish lira keeps to fall when comparing to the dollar and euro (as strong currencies) and has come under more pressure in recent weeks, in a continuing crisis that started in 2018, as investors try to assess whether the country’s central bank will heed the demands of its president to cut interest rates. But a rate cut could drag the lira down further at the same time that the country’s high inflation rate is already diminishing the currency’s buying power.

The overall macroeconomic picture is more vulnerable and uncertain, given rising inflation and unemployment, contracting investment, elevated corporate and financial sector vulnerabilities, and patchy implementation of corrective policy actions and reforms. There are also significant external headwinds due to ongoing geopolitical tensions in the subregion. 

COVID has deepened gender gaps and increased youth unemployment and the poverty rate. The risk of inequalities has also been increasing. The COVID-19 crisis is expected to have severely negative consequences for Turkey, further weakening economic and social gains.

There is an “exchange rate illusion” in Turkey’s economic growth data, according to Enver Erkan, chief economist at Istanbul-based Tera Yatirim, who’s ranked by Bloomberg as the most accurate forecaster on Turkish GDP data.

Noting that the GDP per capita in U.S. dollar terms dropped nearly 40% since 2013 to around $7,700 last year, Erkan said Turkey’s recent economic model isn’t sustainable as the growth is mainly driven by consumption supported by government spending and loan campaigns.

A stronger dollar would also add further pressure to the Turkish lira. Turkey’s currency hit a record low on June 4, when it fell to 8.7532 lira to the U.S. dollar, after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan called for lower interest rates by July or August. That has left investors to assess whether the country’s central bank will heed Mr. Erdogan’s demands.

Mr. Erdogan has fired three central bank chiefs in less than two years, and he prefers low rates as a part of a strategy to encourage growth. His reluctance to have higher interest rates could mean that investors’ returns are eroded. A recent rise in the cost of oil past $70 a barrel is also likely to boost inflation in Turkey.

Turkey’s consumer price inflation eased to 16.59 percent year-on-year in May 2021, from a near two-year high of 17.14 percent in the previous month and below market expectations of 17.25 percent. Still, the rate remined well above the central bank’s medium-term 5 percent target, with upward pressure coming from food and non-alcoholic beverages (17.04 percent vs 16.98 percent in April), transport (28.39 percent vs 29.31 percent), housing and utilities (14.08 percent vs 13.60 percent), furnishings, household equipment and routine maintenance (21.79 percent vs 22.27 percent), hotels, cafes and restaurants (17.73 percent vs 16.81 percent), clothing and footwear (5.75 percent vs 11.03 percent), and miscellaneous goods and services (17.92 percent vs 18.27 percent). The core consumer price inflation rate, which excludes volatile items such as energy, food and non-alcoholic beverages, alcoholic beverages, tobacco and gold, slowed to 16.99 percent in May from 17.77 percent in April.

2. Turkish Inflation Rate, Source: Trading Economics

Turkey’s Industrial Output

3.Turkey’s Industrial Output in March 2021

Turkey grew faster than all Group of 20 nations except for China in the first quarter after nearly stalling a year ago when Covid-19 struck. It’s been bolstered by robust consumption on the back of last year’s government-led push to cut interest rates and boost lending.

Gross domestic product rose 7% from a year earlier and 1.7% from the fourth quarter. The median of 22 forecasts in a Bloomberg survey was for 6.3% growth compared to the same period in 2020.

“This comes at the expense of lira and price stability,” he said.

The government pushed banks to ramp up lending to help businesses and consumers ride out last year’s Covid-19 emergency. The credit boom was coupled with a front-loaded easing cycle that helped prime the economy. That growth push weakened the currency by 20% last year and kept headline inflation in double digits. The size of the economy dropped to $717 billion last year from $760.8 billion a year earlier.

  • Automotive Industry

Turkey’s automotive production, including light commercial vehicles, tractors, and automobiles, amounted to 532,441 million units in January-May, a sectoral report revealed on Monday.

The sector posted a strong recovery with a 28.2% increase year-on-year in the January-May period, after dramatic falls last year due to the COVID-19 pandemic measures.

Last year, the automotive production narrowed by 11% versus 2019 and decreased by 34% year-on-year in the first five months.

While the sector surpassed 2020 figures, it could not reach 2018 and 2019 figures yet, when the production was 712,022 and 625,946 units, respectively.

4. Turkey’s economy Outperforming in first quarter of 2021, Source : Bloomberg
  • Exports

According to the country’s Trade Minister ,Turkey’s foreign sales powered ahead as exporters achieved their second-best May ever.

Exports surged 65.5% year-on-year to reach $16.6 billion (TL 142.48 billion) last month, Muş told a news conference in the capital Ankara.

Sales were up from nearly $10 billion a year ago, battered by the fallout from the coronavirus pandemic that had temporarily shut borders.

They increased despite the strictest lockdown yet that covered part of May. Turkey remains a big trade power in the world as its trade continues rising.

Turkey shipped US$169.5 billion worth of goods around the globe in 2020. That dollar amount reflects an 18.8% increase since 2016 but a -0.9% drop from 2019 to 2020. That figure also represents roughly 0.9% of overall global exports estimated at $18.709 trillion one year earlier during 2019 (calculated as of February 17, 2020).

Applying a continental lens, 55.7% of Turkey’s exports by value were delivered to European countries while 26% were sold to Asian importers. Turkey shipped another 9% worth of goods to Africa. Smaller percentages went to North America (6.9%), Latin America excluding Mexico but including the Caribbean (1.7%) then Oceania led by Australia, Marshall Islands and New Zealand (0.7%).

5.Turkey’s Trade with the European Union, Source: EUROSTAT
6.Turkey among the world’s largest traders of goods, 2019, Source: Eurostat
7. Turkey’s Top Trade Partners, 2019 , Source: Eurostat
8. Turkey among the EU’s main partners for trade in goods, 2020, Source : Eurostat
9. EU trade with Turkey by product group, 2010 and 2020, Source Eurostat

The breakdown of EU trade with Turkey by SITC groups is shown in Figure 6. The red shades denote the primary products: food & drink, raw materials and energy, while the blue shades show the manufactured goods: chemicals, machinery & vehicles and other manufactured goods. Finally, other goods are shown in green. In 2020, EU exports of manufactured goods (84 %) had a higher share than primary goods (12 %). The most exported manufactured goods were machinery & vehicles (44 %), followed by other manufactured products (22 %) and chemicals (18 %). In 2020, EU imports of manufactured goods (87 %) also had a higher share than primary goods (12 %). The most imported manufactured goods were other manufactured products (43 %), followed by machinery & vehicles (39 %) and chemicals (6 %).

10. EU trade with Turkey by group, 2010-2020, Source: Eurostat
11. EU imports of goods from Turkey, 2020 Source Eurostat
12. EU exports of goods to Turkey, 2020, Source: Eurostat

Sources:

1; The Wall Street Journal: Turkey’s Troubles Point to Emerging-Market Risks as Economies Recover, Accessed: 19th of June 2021

2. World Bank. Country : Turkey : Overview. Accessed : 19th of June, 2021

3. Wikipedia: Turkish Currency and Debt Crisis, Accessed : 19th of June, 2021

4. Bloomberg: Turkish Economy Likely Outperformed Most Peers But at a Cost, Accessed : 19th of June, 2021  

5. Borzou Daragahi (25 May 2018). “Erdogan Is Failing Economics 101”. Foreign Policy.

6.“Inflation rise poses challenge to Erdogan as election looms”Financial Times. 5 June 2018.

7.  Matt O’Brien (13 July 2018). “Turkey’s economy looks like it’s headed for a big crash”Washington Post.

8. “Turkey’s Lessons for Emerging Economies – Caixin Global”http://www.caixinglobal.com. Retrieved 20 August 2018.

9. Goujon, Reva (16 August 2018). “Making Sense of Turkey’s Economic Crisis”Stratfor. Archived from the original on 16 August 2018.

Les plus grands succès francophones du Concours Eurovision de la Chanson


Toujours populaire jusqu’au aujourd’hui, le Concours Eurovision de la Chanson… mais presque toujours en anglais! Pourtant, la langue de Molière a eu souvent sa chance sous couleurs françaises, belges, luxembourgeoises et monégasques dans les premières places du Concours. Voici ma sélection des quelques titres chantés en français :

  1. “Ne partez pas sans moi” Céline Dion -1988

Le Concours Eurovision de la Chanson 1988 permettra à la jeune chanteuse québécoise Céline Dion d’offrir une seconde victoire à la Suisse et servira de tremplin à sa carrière internationale.

Ecrite et composée par Nella Martinetti et Atilla Şereftuğ, Ne partez pas sans moi est la dernière chanson interprétée en français ayant gagné le concours à ce jour.

Le 6 février 1988, la Québécoise remporte la sélection suisse au théâtre de Beausobre à Morges.

2. “C’est le dernier qui a parlé qui a raisonAmina Annabi -1991

Amina a représenté la France à l’Eurovision en 1991, avec la chanson C’est Le Dernier Qui A Parlé Qui A Raison. Cette année-là, la France frôle la victoire. Avec 146 points, Amina arrive première ex aequo en nombre de points avec l’Irlande. En cas d’égalité, ce sont les votes maximums qui comptent. Sa concurrente irlandaise avait obtenu comme elle quatre fois la note maximum, de 12. Ce sont donc les “10 points” qui les ont départagées. Amina a obtenu deux fois cette note, contre cinq pour Carole et termine ainsi deuxième.

3. “Poupée de cire, poupée de son”, France Gall -1965

” Poupée de cire, poupée de son “, une chanson écrite par Serge Gainsbourg et avec laquelle France Gall remporte en 1965 le Concours Eurovision de la Chanson pour le Luxembourg.

” Poupée de cire, poupée de son ” est une petite chanson sucrée comme un bonbon… Une chanson rose bonbon… C’est d’ailleurs une des deux couleurs prédominantes du texte, avec le blond. C’est un tube énorme en 1965, devenu un classique du hit-parade, un chef-d’œuvre d’art mineur parce que derrière ce que l’on entend, il faut entendre plus.

C’est l’histoire d’une jeune chanteuse innocente qui est la chose de son auteur qui lui fait tenir des propos dont elle ne saisit pas la portée. C’est l’histoire d’une jeune chanteuse innocente qui est l’objet de sa maison de disques qui lui fait enregistrer des tas de chansons qu’elle n’aime pas –  ce qui est le cas à l’époque. Sciemment et consciemment, Gainsbourg prend pour objet d’étude France Gall elle-même. ” Poupée de cire ” est une chanson sur le business du disque et sur la fabrication d’une idole matraquée (” je suis partout à la fois. “). C’est un témoignage sur le métier de potiche professionnelle, un métier public qui n’a pas bonne réputation car c’est un métier d’exhibition, impudique (” mes disques sont un miroir dans lequel chacun peut me voir. “). D’où la phrase : ” Suis-je meilleure. Suis-je pire. Qu’une poupée de salon. “.

4. Minouche Barelli – “Boum-badaboum” -1967

Boum-Badaboum est la chanson ayant été sélectionnée pour représenter Monaco au Concours Eurovision de la chanson 1967 le 8 avril à Vienne, en Autriche. … La chanson est intégralement interprétée en français, langue officielle de Monaco, comme l’impose la règle entre 1966 et 1973. Elle a fini à la cinquième place.

5. “J’aime la vie”, Sandra Kim -1986

Sandra Caldarone alias Sandra Kim est une chanteuse belge d’origine italienne, née en octobre 1972 à Montegnée près de Liège.

Le 3 mai 1986, elle remporte le Concours Eurovision de la Chanson à Bergen (Norvège) en représentant la Belgique avec ” J’aime la vie “. Elle n’a alors que 13 ans et demi. Elle est la plus jeune gagnante de l’histoire du concours puisque, par la suite, la limite d’âge sera fixée à 15 ans.

” J’aime la vie ” en peu de temps devient double disque de platine. Plus de 350.000 singles vendus en Belgique, 1.400.000 à travers le monde et numéro 1 au Top 50 belge, et ce durant plusieurs semaines.

6. « Je n’ai que mon âme » Natasha St-Pier -2001

Natasha St-Pier s’est fait connaître en 2001 grâce à l’Eurovision, où elle était arrivée quatrième pour la France avec “Je n’ai que mon âme”.

Natasha St-Pier, de son vrai nom Natasha Saint-Pierre, est une chanteuse et animatrice canadienne, d’origines acadienne, bretonne et italienne, née le 10 février 1981 à Bathurst, au Nouveau-Brunswick (Canada).

Dans le clip, elle interprète la chanson intégralement en français. Plusieurs jours avant le concours, dans les médias, elle laisse planer le doute quant à l’utilisation ou non de l’anglais lors de sa future interprétation sur la scène de l’Eurovision.

Le 12 mai 2001, à Copenhague au Danemark, lors de son passage, tout en conservant le titre français, elle interprète la chanson pour les 2/3 en français et le dernier couplet en anglais. Elle obtient trois douze points attribués par la Bosnie-Herzégovine, le Portugal et la Russie. Au même niveau de Patrick Fiori en 1993 et Nathalie Santamaria en 1995, Natasha St-Pier donne la 4e place à la France sur vingt-trois pays, un résultat jamais égalé depuis.

7. “J”ai chérché” , Amir -2016

En 2016, Amir est officiellement désigné pour représenter la France au concours de l’Eurovision. Pour l’occasion, le chanteur franco-israélien choisit d’interpréter le titre “J’ai cherché”. Il faut savoir que ce titre était déjà prévu pour figurer sur le premier album d’Amir, “Au cœur de moi”, enregistré après son parcours dans “The Voice”. Le succès de son interprétation au concours de chant participera activement à la promotion de cet album.

“J’ai cherché” se positionne très rapidement parmi les chouchous des bookmakers et des observateurs spécialistes du concours. Si le titre fait plus que bien se défendre, il terminera finalement sixième du concours avec un excellent score de 257 points. Cela n’empêche pas le titre de cartonner dans les bacs.

Atteignant la deuxième place des ventes de singles et la première en ce qui concerne les diffusions radio, “J’ai cherché” reste l’un des plus gros succès commerciaux du chanteur, terminant disque de platine. Il sera par ailleurs nommé à la Victoire de la musique de la Chanson originale de l’année, s’inclinant face à “Je m’en vais” de Vianney. Fin 2019, le cinéaste québécois Xavier Dolan la remet au goût du jour en l’intégrant dans une séquence de son film “Matthias et Maxime”.

8. Tu te reconnaîtras“, Anne-Marie David -1973

Ce fut la quatrième victoire du Luxembourg et la deuxième consécutive.

En 1973, Anne-Marie DAVID obtient le Grand Prix international du disque de l’académie Charles CROS avec la chanson “Aimer et gagne” . Gagnant ainsi une reconnaissance, Anne-Marie DAVID est choisie pour représenter le Luxembourg à l’Eurovision qu’elle remporte avec le titre “Tu te reconnaitras”. C’est une année fantastique  puisque qu’elle obtient également un Prix d’Interprétation au World Festival Song à Tokyo.

La chanson gagnante “Tu te reconnaitras ” remporta 129 votes sur 160 possibles, soit 81 % du maximum. Il s’agit d’un record, tous systèmes de vote confondus.

Après son succès en 1973, Anne-Marie DAVID, retente sa chance à l’Eurovision, en 1979 en représentant alors la France avec ” Je suis l’enfant soleil” et se classe troisième, avec 106 points.

Bonne écoute en espérant que les chansons chantées en français finiront dans le podium. Il y a beaucoup de chances que la France et la Suisse remportent le Concours cette année. Toutes les places sont trustées par des titres en français : « Je me casse » de Malte à la première place, « Voilà » de la France en deuxième place, et « Tout l’univers » de la Suisse sur la dernière marche.

Bonne chance !